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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Dispersion in Analysts’ Forecasts: Does it Make a Difference? 
 
Davit Adut, B.B.A., Istanbul University; 
 
M.B.A., Saint Mary’s University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Martha Loudder 
 
 
Financial analysts are an important group of information intermediaries in the capital 
markets. Their reports, including both earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, 
are widely transmitted and have a significant impact on stock prices (Womack 1996; Lys 
and Sohn 1990, among others).  Empirical accounting research frequently relies on 
analysts’ forecasts to construct proxies for variables of interest. For example, the error in 
mean forecast is used as a proxy for earnings surprise (e.g., Brown et al.1987; Wiedman 
1996; Bamber et al.1997). More recent papers provide evidence that the mean consensus 
forecast is used as a benchmark for evaluating firm performance. (Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). 
Another stream of research uses the forecast dispersion as a proxy for the uncertainty 
or the degree of consensus among analysts and focuses on the information properties of 
analysts (e.g., Daley et al. 1988; Ziebart 1990; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Barron and Stuerke 1998; Barron et al. 1998).  In this paper I combine 
the two streams of research, and investigate how lack of consensus changes the 
information environment of analysts and whether the markets perceive this change. 
More specifically, I investigate the amount of private information in a divergent earnings 
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estimate (i.e. one that is above or below the consensus), whether the markets react to it at 
either the time of the forecast release, at the realization of actual earnings, and whether 
Regulation Fair Disclosure has changed the information environment differently for high 
and low dispersion firms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Financial analysts are an important group of information intermediaries in the 
capital markets. Their reports, including both earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations, are widely transmitted and have a significant impact on stock prices 
(Womack 1996; Lys and Sohn 1990, among others).  Empirical accounting research 
frequently relies on analysts’ forecasts to construct proxies for variables of interest. For 
example, the error in mean forecast is used as a proxy for earnings surprise (e.g., Brown 
et al.1987; Wiedman 1996; Bamber et al.1997). More recent papers provide evidence 
that the mean consensus forecast is used as a benchmark for evaluating firm 
performance. (Degeorge et al. 1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 
2002).    
 
Another stream of research uses the forecast dispersion as a proxy for the 
uncertainty or the degree of consensus among analysts and focuses on the information 
properties of analysts (e.g., Daley et al. 1988; Ziebart 1990; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; 
Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barron and Stuerke 1998; Barron et al. 1998).1   
                                                 
This dissertation  follows the style of  Accounting Review. 
1 These papers specifically deal with the information environment as it is related to private information. 
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In this paper, I combine the two streams of research and investigate how lack of 
consensus changes the information environment of analysts and whether the markets 
perceive this change. 2More specifically, I investigate the amount of private information 
in a divergent earnings estimate (i.e. one that is above or below the consensus), whether 
the markets react to it at either the time of the forecast release, at the realization of actual 
earnings, and whether Regulation Fair Disclosure has changed the information 
environment differently for high and low dispersion firms.3   
 As information intermediaries, financial analysts’ careers depend crucially on 
their reputation.  Analyst reputation, defined as perceived ability to accurately forecast 
earnings, affects the impact of their research on investors’ investment decisions (Stickel 
1992). 4 Related studies provide evidence that analyst reputation decreases with past 
forecast boldness, which is defined as the deviation from the consensus forecast.  In an 
equilibrium setting, analysts should receive some benefit from these divergent estimates; 
otherwise they would not issue them. Fischer and Verrecchia (1998) formulate a model 
which predicts that an analyst receives benefits by issuing non-redundant information 
and these benefits increase to the extent that the information is unique to that analyst.  In 
a sense, these conditions increase the rents associated with information asymmetry.  One 
alternative explanation for divergence is that the analyst is simply wrong.  
                                                 
 
2 Prior studies provide evidence that divergent forecasts occur but these studies have not tested the market 
reaction associated with divergent forecasts. 
3 One of the main goals of  Regulation Fair Disclosure is to level the playing field for investors by limiting 
the amount of private communication between firms and influential investors. Research to date has 
focused on the effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure and investigated the dispersion, and the amount of 
private information. This study differentiates itself by examining the effects of dispersion, and the effects 
of Reg FD. 
4  Stickel (1992) finds that forecast revisions of analysts with better reputations have a greater impact on 
stock prices than those of other analysts.  
 
 
3
 To control for this effect, I will partition my sample based on analysts’ skill level. 5 The 
underlying assumption is that skilled analysts will be more inclined to protect their 
reputation and will not risk incurring the costs associated with providing an inaccurate 
and a divergent forecast unless they have private information from which they can draw 
rents. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that as the divergence from the consensus 
estimate increases, the amount of private information conveyed by divergent forecasts 
issued by skilled analysts will also increase.  
 Whether private information can be inferred from a divergent forecast is an 
empirical question that I test. However, this test can provide insight only with respect to 
the analysts’ information environment.   A more interesting question is whether or not 
the markets actually perceive this private information and if so, do they price it 
accordingly? As a natural extension, I investigate whether or not the markets perceive 
more information in divergent forecasts issued by skilled analysts. If the hypothesis 
holds and the divergent forecasts issued by skilled analysts contain more private 
information, I expect to find a more pronounced market reaction at the announcement 
date of these types of forecasts.  
 Degeorge et al. (1999) provide evidence that analysts’ expectations are used as a 
benchmark for managing earnings. In a related study, Lopez and Rees (2002) provide 
evidence that the market gives a premium to positive forecast errors by assigning a 
higher multiple to the level of positive unexpected earnings. Additionally, the market 
assesses an additional penalty for missing forecasts that is unrelated to the magnitude of 
                                                 
5 Skill can be defined in many different ways. One measure is to investigate the past accuracy. An 
alternative way is to rely on lists that are provided by business media.  
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those forecast errors. Both of these studies, as well as many other studies, assume the 
veracity of the I\B\E\S consensus forecast as a benchmark, but do not consider the 
degree of consensus that this benchmark represents. In this paper, I argue that the degree 
of consensus is an important consideration in measuring the premium and the penalty 
associated with forecast errors. 
Research to date has focused on the benchmarks identified by the mean consensus 
estimate. This paper provides evidence that lack of consensus should also be considered 
when specifying a benchmark and when evaluating the performance against that 
benchmark.   If there is a market response to divergent forecasts by skilled analysts due 
to additional private information, it may be that skilled analysts can provide a better 
benchmark for high dispersion firms.  Kim et al. (2001) show analytically that mean 
analysts’ forecasts inefficiently aggregate information by assigning too much weight to 
analysts’ common information relative to their private information when used as a 
summary forecast measure of forthcoming earnings.  To empirically examine this 
question, this paper tests whether or not for high dispersion firms, the market response 
associated with forecast errors will be conditional upon dispersion and skill level of the 
analysts.  
 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) official release entitled 
“Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading” ,commonly known as Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (or Reg FD), was adopted on August 10, 2000, and became effective on 
October 23, 2000. A primary objective of Reg FD is to eliminate  the selective disclosure 
of all material information regarding companies’ past and future operating performance 
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and thereby, to  level the playing field between analysts, institutional investors, and 
individual investors. Shane et al. (2002) provide evidence that Reg FD has reduced the 
amount of private information available to analysts at the beginning of an earnings 
period; however, analysts are able to compensate by gathering more information 
throughout the period. Mohanram and Sunder (2001) find that absolute forecast errors 
and dispersion increase after the implementation.  They also find that the importance of 
both idiosyncratic discovery and of analysis increases. Research to date on this area 
assumes that Reg FD affects all companies and these studies use all companies to test the 
effects. However,  Holthausen and Verrecchia (1989) provides evidence that private 
information becomes more valuable as the uncertainty increases. Therefore Regulation 
Fair Disclosure can have varying implications conditional upon dispersion associated 
with the firm. This paper differentiates itself by investigating the ratio of private to 
public information conditional upon dispersion.  
As I discuss in detail throughout the paper, an understanding of the effects of lack 
of consensus among the analysts is important for three reasons.   First, it is important to 
realize that divergent forecasts convey more private information that could be useful to 
investors.  Second, lack of consensus is important for firm valuations because it affects 
the benchmarks upon which companies are valued.  Finally, this paper emphasizes that 
lack of consensus can have varying implications with regards to new regulations 
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission.6 
                                                 
6 For example, the amount of private information can be higher for high dispersion firms but can stay 
constant for low dispersion firms.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized in six chapters. The next chapter provides 
the literature review and the hypothesis development.  Chapter III explains the research 
design.  Chapter IV describes the sample selection procedures and provides some 
descriptive statistics. Chapter V presents the main empirical findings and Chapter VI 
provides a brief summary and presents conclusions, limitations and ideas for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Dispersion Literature 
 Several papers have investigated the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. Chen et al. 
(1990) investigated the effects of the statement of financial accounting standards No.52. 
The authors use forecast dispersion as a relevant measure of firm risk and conclude that 
a reduction in dispersion associated with the adoption of SFAS No 52 provides evidence 
with regards to an economic consequence associated with the adoption of the accounting 
standard. 
 Ajinkya et al. (1991) provide empirical evidence that trading volume is positively 
related to the degree of differing beliefs. The extent of disagreement or dispersion in 
financial analysts’ forecast of annual earnings per share for a firm is employed as the 
proxy for agents’ differing beliefs about the firm’s prospects. The revision in analysts’ 
mean earnings per share forecasts is used to control for the volume effects of the net 
information signals emanating during the period. The results indicate a significant 
positive association between the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share 
and the volume of trading. A relatively stable and positive association is found even after 
controlling for the volume effects of the magnitude of monthly revisions in the mean 
analysts’ forecasts. The evidence corroborates the theoretical result that the degree of 
heterogeneity in beliefs is a determinant of the intensity of trading.  
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 Imhoff and Lobo (1992) examine the effect of uncertainty in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts in terms of the relation between unexpected returns and unexpected earnings. 
The variance in analysts’ earnings forecasts just prior to a firm’s annual earnings 
announcement is employed as a firm-specific proxy for ex ante uncertainty. The results 
of the study indicate a systematic relation between ex ante uncertainty and the 
information content of the earnings. A given unit of earnings news has a greater effect 
on unexpected stock price change as the amount of pre-earnings announcement 
uncertainty decreases. Firms with relatively high ex ante uncertainty exhibit little or no 
systematic price change at the time earnings are announced.   
 Goss and Waegelein (1993) examine the association between executive 
compensation and security analysts’ forecast dispersion in an agency setting. The 
authors hypothesize that firms that compensate managers with long-term performance 
plans and high percentages of managerial stock will be less likely to engage in 
manipulation of financial statements and their financial performance will be easier to 
predict, thus resulting in less dispersed forecasts. The results of the study provide 
evidence that firms that compensate their managers with long-term performance plans 
and higher levels of the company stock have less dispersion associated with their 
security analysts’ forecasts and greater dispersion of their long-term growth in earnings.  
 Lang and Lundholm (1996) examine the relations between the disclosure 
practices of firms, the number of analysts following each firm and properties of the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The authors provide evidence that firms with more 
informative disclosure policies have larger analyst following, more accurate analyst 
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earnings forecast, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in 
forecast revisions.   
 Lobo and Tung (1998) investigate the relationship between the dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings 
announcements. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows 
that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcement is positively related to 
the degree of analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion.  
Information Environment 
 Several papers have investigated the information environment of the analysts. 
Brown et al. (1987) present a model that provides determinants of ex ante forecast 
accuracy and examines conditions under which a particular forecasting approach would 
yield superior measure of earnings surprise. The authors find that the superior 
forecasting ability of analysts over time-series models is related to characteristics of a 
firm’s information environment, namely firm size and the dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 Stickel (1989) provides evidence on the demand for and supply of analyst 
forecasts of the annual earnings per share. Evidence is provided on the timing of 
forecasts around interim earnings announcements and on the effect of incentives on 
revision activity. The results indicate that annual earnings forecasts are relatively stale or 
out of date in the two weeks prior to interim announcements. In the two weeks after 
interim announcements, revision activity increases. This increase is greater if absolute 
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unexpected interim earnings are larger, if there are more competing analysts, if 
unexpected interim earnings are negative and if it is late in the fiscal year.  
 Holthausen and Verrecchia (1989) present a partially revealing rational 
expectations model of competitive trading to identify two effects of information releases; 
an informedness effect and a consensus effect. The informedness effect measures the 
extent to which agents become more knowledgeable, and the consensus effect measures 
the extent of agreement among agents at the time of an information release. The authors 
demonstrate that informedness and consensus generally occur jointly when information 
is disseminated, and that unexpected price changes and trading volume are each 
influenced by both informedness and consensus.  The paper provides an economic 
rationale for examining both price and volume effects at the time of information 
releases. 
 Lys and Sohn (1990) investigate the information content of analyst earnings 
forecast revisions in a setting where numerous analysts follow a given company. The 
results indicate that individual analyst earnings forecast revisions reflect “some, but not 
all” of the information. The authors also investigate whether forecasts for a given 
company occurring in close succession are a mere copy of each other.  Forecast revisions 
occurring in close succession are likely to be correlated, because the information 
received by analysts is not likely to be independent. However, if analysts act 
independently, individual forecasts will contain some idiosyncratic information and 
consecutive forecast revisions will be informative. The results provide evidence that 
analyst earnings forecasts are informative independent of the time elapsed since the 
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preceding forecast, indicating that investors perceive analysts to act independently. The 
authors also examine the relative importance of the innovative and the confirmatory 
components of consecutive forecast revisions. As the accuracy of individual analysts 
forecasts decreases, investors will reduce their response to individual forecasts that 
deviate from the consensus because these forecasts are likely to be in accurate. Thus, 
when analyst earnings forecasts are sufficiently noisy, individual forecast revisions will 
be informative not only because they provide “new information” but also because they 
confirm information provided by the preceding forecasts. The evidence indicates that 
confirmatory and innovative components of forecast revisions are equally important for 
security evaluation.   
 Wiedman (1996) extends Brown et al. (1987) by testing whether the 
characteristics of firms’ information environment, namely, firm size and dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts are also related to superiority as a proxy for the market’s expectations 
for earnings. The paper provides evidence that analysts forecast errors have a higher 
association with excess returns than random walk forecast errors for the overall sample 
and that this higher association is positively related to firm size and negatively related to 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
 Barron et al. (1998) presents a model that relates properties of the analysts’ 
information environment to the properties of their forecasts. First, the authors express 
forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and 
consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief).  Second, the 
authors show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts 
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can be measured by using the overall uncertainty and the average pair wise covariance 
among analysts’ beliefs.7 The authors base their analysis on a model of expectations in 
which each analyst observes two signals about future earnings. One public (common 
across all analysts) and one private.  The findings of the paper provide guidance on how 
to construct valid measures of uncertainty and consensus from widely available earnings 
forecast and realization data.  
 Kim et al. (2001) show analytically that mean analysts forecasts inefficiently 
aggregate information by assigning too much weight to analysts’ common information 
relative to their private information when used as a summary forecast measure of 
forthcoming earnings. The authors show that inadequate information weighing can 
constitute a large portion of expected forecast errors. Unlike the effects of individual 
analysts’ biases, the overweighing of common information, and the resulting 
inefficiency of the mean forecast, are exacerbated as the number of analyst forecasting 
increases.   A more precise summary forecast of earnings than the current mean forecast 
is the current mean forecast plus a positive multiple of the change in the mean forecast.   
 Barron et al. (2002) examine the information analysts’ forecasts convey, how the 
characteristics of this information change after earnings announcements, and how this 
information relates to the number of analysts producing new forecasts after earnings 
announcements. The authors focus on changes in the degree to which forecasts of 
different analysts convey redundant information after earnings announcements.  
                                                 
7 A more detailed explanation can be found in the paper on pages 424-426. 
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The authors provide evidence that precision and the amount of analysts’ common and 
private information both increase around earnings announcements. The authors also 
provide evidence that analyst’s incorporate most private information in their forecast 
revisions following earnings announcements and, as a result the mean forecast becomes 
more informative because it reflects a richer set of information. 
 Regulation Fair Disclosure 
 Several recent academic studies investigate the effect of Reg FD on the 
information environment. Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003) report that after Reg 
FD’s effective date, return volatility surrounding earnings announcement was lower, 
post-announcement price convergence was faster, analyst forecast bias, accuracy and 
dispersion remained relatively unchanged, and the quantity of the voluntary forward-
looking disclosures by companies increased. Over all, the authors conclude that Reg FD 
has not resulted in a deterioration of the information environment. 
 Shane, Soderstrom, and Yoon (2002) study a longer post-Reg FD period and find 
that long-term absolute forecast errors are larger in the post-Reg FD periods relative to 
errors documented in 1999. However, after controlling for the long term uncertainty and 
the sign of the short-term absolute forecast error, they find that short-term absolute 
forecast errors are significantly lower in the post-Reg FD period compared to the 
preceding year. In addition, the authors find a smaller absolute price response to earnings 
announcements in the post –Reg FD period compared to the preceding year. Taken 
together, the results suggest that Reg FD has reduced the amount of private information 
available to analysts at the beginning of the earnings period, however, analysts are able 
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to compensate by gathering more information throughout the period until ultimately, the 
level of publicly available information prior to the earnings announcement is as high or 
higher than the pre-Reg FD periods. 
 Mohanram and Sunder (2001) analyze the impact of Reg FD on analysts’ 
forecasting ability. The authors find that both absolute forecast errors and forecast 
dispersion increase after the implementation of Reg FD. The authors also find that the 
importance of idiosyncratic discovery and analysis increases in the post Reg FD period.  
Overall, the results of the study support the SEC’s stated objective for Reg FD first by 
showing that superior analysts are more likely to differentiate themselves in the post Reg 
FD world and second by demonstrating that analysts’ incentives to gather private 
information and perform independent analysis are enhanced after Reg FD.  
Zitzewitz (2002) investigate the issue of private and public information by 
investigating the day that the forecast is issued. He posits that when several analysts’ 
forecasts occur on the same day, it is usually due to value-relevant information about the 
firm being disclosed to the general public. In contrast, the occurrence of a single forecast 
suggests that the analyst is private information to update their expectations.  The author 
finds that consistent with the intended affects of Reg FD, the percentage of analysts’ 
forecasts that occurred on days when no other analyst issued a forecast changed from 70 
percent in the pre-Reg FD period to 50 percent in the post-Reg FD period.  
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Meeting and Beating Expectations 
 Degeorge et al. (1999) examine earnings management as a response to implicit 
and explicit rewards for attaining specific levels of earnings, such as positive earnings, 
an improvement over last year, or the market’s consensus forecast. The authors posit that 
managers manage their earnings to exceed three thresholds. The first is to report profits 
as opposed to losses, which arises from the psychologically important distinction 
between positive and negative numbers. The second and the third benchmarks are 
performance relative to prior comparable period and performance relative to analysts’ 
earnings projections. The results indicate that the positive EPS threshold is the most 
important; it prevails regardless of whether or not the other two thresholds are met. The 
threshold of previous period earnings is the second in importance: it asserts itself only if 
the positive EPS threshold is met, but it is present regardless of whether earnings make 
the analysts’ forecast. The threshold of analysts’ forecast is the weakest; mattering if 
both the other thresholds are met. 
 Kasznik and McNichols (2002) examine whether firms achieve greater share 
value, all else equal, by meeting analysts’ expectations. The authors hypothesize that 
firms meeting expectations receive either of two kinds of market rewards, higher 
analysts’ earnings forecast that lead to higher valuations or a market reward controlling 
for earnings forecasts.   The authors find that analysts’ forecasts are not higher for firms 
that meet expectations relative to those that do not, controlling for the level of current 
year’s earnings information.  The authors also find that one or two years ahead earnings 
are higher for firms that meet expectations relative to those that do not. Earnings three 
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years ahead, however, are not generally greater for firms that consistently meet 
expectations, controlling for analysts’ post-announcement earnings forecasts. These 
findings indicate firms meeting expectations are not”rewarded” by analysts with higher 
earnings forecasts than are warranted.  
 Lopez and Rees (2002) examine the difference in stock price sensitivity between 
positive and negative forecast errors to investigate whether the market rewards 
(penalizes) firms for (not) beating analysts’ forecasts. The authors also assess whether 
the sensitivity of stock prices to current forecast errors differs for firms with a historical 
tendency to consistently report positive earnings surprises. The evidence suggests that 
the increasing frequency of positive forecast errors is a rational response by managers to 
three market-related incentives. First, the market yields a premium to positive forecast 
errors by assigning a higher multiple to the level of unexpected earnings. Second, the 
market assesses an additional penalty, unrelated to the magnitude of the forecast error, to 
firms that do not meet forecasts. Third, though the market recognizes historical patterns 
of forecast errors and adjusts for the systematic component of unexpected earnings, it 
rewards firms that consistently beat earnings forecasts by attaching a higher multiple to 
the unsystematic portion of unexpected earnings.  
 Bartov et al. (2002) examine the manner by which earnings expectations are met, 
measure the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations  (MBE) formed just 
prior to the release of quarterly earnings, and test alternative explanations for this 
reward. The evidence supports the claims that MBE phenomenon has become more 
widespread in recent years and that the pattern by which MBE is obtained is consistent 
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with both earnings management and expectation management. More importantly, the 
evidence shows that after controlling for overall earnings performance in the quarter, 
firms that manage to meet or beat their earnings expectations enjoy an average quarterly 
return that is almost 3% higher than firms who fail to do so. While investors appear to 
discount MBE cases that are likely to result from expectation or earnings management, 
the premium in the cases is still significant. These results indicate that the market places 
a premium on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 Chevis et al. (2001) study the characteristics of firms that consistently meet or 
exceed analysts’ expectations over a long time period spanning multiple quarters. The 
authors find that firms that meet the expectations are more likely to be firms with higher 
growth, a pattern of increasing earnings, a larger analyst following, lower forecast 
dispersion among analyst, and greater earnings stability. The authors also find that price-
earnings multiple is on average higher for profit firms that meet the expectations 
conditional on growth, leverage and a pattern of increasing earnings. 
The present study differs from the previously cited studies in some important 
ways. First, this study extends past studies in dispersion and previous “meet or beat” 
literature by investigating the effects of dispersion on the premium associated with 
“meeting or beating”. Prior literature has investigated the price and the volume reaction 
to analysts’ forecast dispersion, but these studies have not investigated the effects of 
dispersion on the premium. This issue is important to investigate because of the 
emphasis placed on meeting or beating the estimates. Anecdotal and academic literatures 
both provide evidence that firms can lose market value by not meeting analysts’ 
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estimates.8 This paper will provide additional evidence regarding how this premium will 
change with regards to dispersion, and answer the question:  will the markets react to 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts or will they be fixated on meeting or beating without 
any other conditions?    
Second, this paper will propose a different benchmark for markets’ expectations. 
This paper posits that the most recent forecast will be a better proxy for firms with high 
dispersion. Research to date has focused on the use of mean forecasts as a proxy.   Kim 
et al. (2001) analytically provide evidence that   when analysts possess both the common 
and private information, the mean forecast over weights the information common to all 
analysts, thereby failing to fully exploit their private information. However, in the case 
of high dispersion, analysts will have incentives to provide more private information 
therefore the market reaction to the most recent forecast should be higher than the mean 
forecast for high dispersion firms.9 One other possible explanation is that the different 
market reaction could be just due to the elapsed time. To control for this effect, I will 
also investigate the market reaction to firms with low dispersion. My expectation is that 
the market reaction for high-dispersion firms will be higher than the market reaction for 
the firms with low dispersion. 
Third, Barron et al. (2002) provides evidence those amounts of analysts’ 
common and private information both increase around earnings announcements.  
                                                 
8 Lopez and Rees (2001). 
9 Using Barron et al. (1998). This can be tested. 
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This finding suggests that earnings announcements typically cause more new 
common information to be conveyed in individual analysts’ forecasts than private 
information.   The authors posit that relative increases in analysts’ private information 
after earnings announcements are larger, in large part because analysts start out with 
little or no private information about earnings. This paper differentiates itself by positing 
that in the case of high dispersion, the analysts will communicate more private 
information before the announcements; therefore the mean of the most recent forecasts 
will be more valuable. In addition, this paper will provide evidence by testing the market 
reaction controlling for the dispersion. 
Finally, research to date provides conflicting results with regards to dispersion. 
Heflin et al. provide evidence that dispersion has not changed after the Reg FD.  
Mohanram and Sunder (2001) provide evidence that dispersion has changed and they 
provide additional information on how Reg FD has caused a shift between private and 
public information. This paper will provide a contribution by comparing how dispersion 
affects the shift between the private and the public information after and before the 
implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure. My study differentiates itself by 
investigating the effectiveness of Reg FD for high dispersion firms.  
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Accounting research frequently relies on analysts’ forecasts to construct proxies 
for variables of interest. For example, the error in the mean forecast is used as a proxy 
for earnings surprise (e.g., Brown et al.1987; Wiedman; 1996; Bamber et al.1997).  In 
addition, forecast dispersion and the error in the mean forecast is used as a proxy for the 
uncertainty or the degree of consensus among analysts or market participants (e.g., 
Daley et al.1988; Ziebart 1990; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Lang and Lundholm 1996; 
Barron and Stuerke 1998). Although the effects of dispersion have been investigated in 
previous literature, it is still not clear why certain analysts choose to deviate from the 
consensus estimates, and what information is revealed by their actions. This paper 
investigates forecasts that diverge from the consensus. I posit that these forecasts will 
contain private information, conditional on the reputation of the individual analyst and 
on the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
The intuition underlying my hypothesis stems from an equilibrium argument 
where the benefits of issuing a divergent forecast (i.e., one that is above or below the 
consensus estimate) should outweigh the reputation costs of issuing an incorrect 
forecast. Prior papers  provide evidence that an analyst’s reputation is of great 
importance to that analysts’ career and reputation decreases with past forecast error 
boldness, which is defined as a deviation from the consensus. The fact that we observe 
divergent forecasts suggests that there should be benefits associated with them. Fischer 
and Verrecchia (1998) formulate a model which predicts that each analysts’ dominant 
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concern is to increase the net benefits to those trading on the analysts’ own non-
redundant information.  These benefits decrease to the degree that other informed 
investors act on the same information. Under these circumstances, an analyst might risk 
his reputation only if he or she has private information that can be used to generate rents 
from information asymmetry. My first hypothesis posits that the amount of private 
information increases as the distance from the existing consensus increases. One 
alternative explanation for the distance from the consensus to be high is that a specific 
analyst can provide an estimate that is wrong. I will control for this by investigating the 
accuracy of the forecast. These reasons provide the basis for my first hypothesis. 
H1:  As the distance from the existing consensus estimate increases, so does the amount 
of private information contained in skilled analysts’ estimates. 
  
To further my investigation, I examine the markets’ reaction to a divergent 
forecast. The model presented above does not speak to markets’ perceptions10. In other 
words, if markets perceive divergent forecast by skilled analysts to have more 
information, then there will be a more pronounced market reaction at the announcement 
date of the divergent forecast.  These reasons provide the basis for my second 
hypothesis. 
   H2: As the distance from the existing consensus estimate increases, the market reaction 
will be more pronounced to the divergent estimate issued by the skilled analysts.  
 
                                                 
10 This model deals with analysts’ information environment.  
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Degeorge et al. (1999) provide evidence that meeting analysts’ expectations is used 
as a benchmark for managing earnings. In a related study, Lopez and Rees (2002) 
provide evidence that market yields a premium to positive forecast errors by assigning a 
higher multiple to the level of positive unexpected earnings. Additionally, the market 
assesses an additional penalty for missing forecasts that is unrelated to the magnitude of 
the forecast errors. Both of these studies take as given the veracity of the I\B\E\S 
consensus forecast as a benchmark and do not consider the degree of consensus that this 
benchmark represents. In this paper, I argue that the degree of consensus is an important 
consideration in measuring the premium associated with positive forecast errors. 
Intuitively, a large dispersion in analysts’ forecasts indicates that there is little 
consensus among analysts with respect to the future earnings performance. In this case, 
using a point estimate as a benchmark for evaluating firm performance ignores the 
degree of uncertainty associated with the estimate.  Because the degree of dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts is publicly available information, it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
the market will impound the degree of uncertainty surrounding the consensus forecast. In 
particular, I hypothesize that the investor confidence in a positive forecast error will be 
greater when the forecast error is derived from a forecast that reflects a greater degree of 
consensus among analysts. That is, the probability that observed positive errors are 
actually positive would be greater when there is a greater degree of consensus among 
analysts. Accordingly, my third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: The market response associated with forecast errors will be significantly different 
for high dispersion firms (low consensus) as compared to low dispersion firms (high 
consensus). 
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 Hypothesis three provides evidence that lack of consensus is associated with a 
differential market response. Prior research also provides evidence that there is a 
premium associated with meeting or beating the mean consensus estimate, which 
suggests that it is perceived as a benchmark.  To further investigate the effects of 
dispersion, I partition the estimates into high dispersion and low dispersion sub-samples 
and test whether there is a difference in the premium associated with meeting or beating 
the estimates between skilled and unskilled analysts.  More specifically, I change the 
benchmark from the mean consensus estimate to a mean estimate from skilled analysts 
and compare the effect of dispersion among these categories. A difference in the 
premiums provides evidence that the premium or the penalty associated with meeting or 
beating the estimates varies according to the benchmark used.  My fourth hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
 
   H4: The premium (penalty) associated with positive (negative) errors will be conditional 
upon dispersion and the skill level of analysts that issues the estimates.  
 
Shane et al. (2002) provide evidence that Reg FD has reduced the amount of 
private information available to analysts at the beginning of the earnings period. 
However, analysts are able to compensate by gathering more information throughout the 
period until, ultimately, the level of publicly available information prior to earnings 
announcements is  as high as or higher than pre-Reg FD periods. Mohanram and Sunder 
(2001) find that absolute forecast errors and dispersion increase after the implementation 
of Reg FD. The authors also find that the importance of idiosyncratic discovery and 
analysis increases in the post- Reg FD. Research to date assumes that Reg FD will have 
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the same effect on all companies. However, Fischer and Verrecchia (1998) provide 
evidence that private information is more valuable as uncertainty increases; as the 
distance from the consensus increases. In cases where the lack of consensus is high, the 
markets’ expectations are not clear and the price discovery process is not finished; 
therefore, private information is more valuable. On the other hand, for low dispersion 
firms the price discovery process is completed and the value of private information is 
relatively low.  I predict that if Reg FD has curtailed the information environment with 
regards to getting private information from  managers, then the ratio of public to private 
information  between the high and low dispersion firms should be larger in the post- Reg 
FD period. On the other hand, if Reg FD has enhanced the information environment then 
the ratio of private information to private information between the high dispersion and 
low dispersion firms should be lower in the post -Reg FD period.  This reasoning 
provides the basis for my two-sided fifth hypothesis. 
         H50: Regulation Fair Disclosure has had no effect on the ratio of public to private 
information between high and low dispersion firms.  
 
        H51: Regulation Fair Disclosure has changed the ratio of public to private information 
between high and low dispersion firms. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
4.1 Private Information 
 
 My first hypothesis posits that for high dispersion firms, as the distance from the 
consensus estimate increases, the estimates issued by skilled analysts will contain more 
private information. To test this hypothesis, one needs to have a measure of overall 
uncertainty and the amount of private information contained in analysts’ estimates.  
Barron et al. (1998) develop a model that allows for the inference of fundamental 
properties of analysts’ information from observed individual forecasts. In their model, 
the authors analytically show that expected forecast dispersion is a function of the total 
variability and the amount of consensus among analysts. Total variability is measured as 
the average of the total variance that exists in the analysts’ forecasts, and consensus is 
measured as the covariance among analysts’ forecast errors.11 
 
    D= V-C       (1) 
where; 
D= expected forecast dispersion, 
V= is the measure of overall uncertainty, and 
C= is the measure of consensus.  
                                                 
11 For a more detailed explanation, refer to Barron et al. (1998) page 426. 
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 For a firm to be classified as high dispersion, it should have a high value for V 
and a low value for C. In other words, the variance among analysts should be high and 
there should be a lack of consensus among the analysts. In this paper, I posit that as the 
distance from the consensus estimate increases, the amount of private information will 
also increase. When the distance increases, the covariance will decrease only if the new 
information is private.  Alternatively, if the increase in the distance is due to public 
information, then the covariance will increase as will the ratio of the common 
information (covariance between the estimates) to the total variability. Following this 
logic, I employ a model that focuses on the analyst properties of uncertainty (U) and 
consensus (ρ), to infer the amount of private information contained in analysts’ 
published forecasts.  Uncertainty (U) and consensus (ρ) are expressed as follows: 
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and Fa is the forecast by analyst a, 
 F is the mean forecast, and 
 E is the actual earnings.  
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Barron et al. (1998) demonstrate that errors in common versus private 
information influence forecast dispersion and errors differently, and yield insights into 
how certain theoretical properties of the analysts’ information environment are reflected 
in empirical forecast measures. The intuition behind this approach can be explained by 
referring to two theoretical constructs: uncertainty and consensus. “Uncertainty“refers to 
the expected squared error in individual forecasts aggregated across the total number of 
analysts. “Consensus” refers to the degree to which analysts share a common belief.12  It 
is measured by the covariance among analysts.   
Based on Barron’s theoretical constructs, I create a proxy for the private 
information of a specific analyst. I use a revolving approach and update  ρ every time a 
new estimate is added to the information set.  This procedure provides an incrementalρ, 
which is the measure that should be used to test the amount of private information in a 
specific forecast. Due to the design of the measure, ρ is not meaningful when the number 
of forecasts issued for a specific firm is low. Therefore, I delete those observations that 
have a low analyst following13. The distance from the consensus estimate is the absolute 
difference calculated by subtracting the estimate from the consensus estimate at the time 
of the specific forecast.  
                                                 
12 This consensus construct is also used by Holthausen  and Verrecchia (1990)  
13 The cut-off point is disclosed in the appropriate table. 
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4.2 Regression Models  
 My first hypothesis predicts that as the distance from the consensus estimate 
increases, the amount of private information contained in skilled analysts’ estimates 
increase. This hypothesis is tested by estimating the following least squares regression: 
 
Dist it  =  αo  +  β1 ρit   + β2 Skill k  +   β3 (Skill  
                                                
k * ρit ) + εit      (6) 
where: 
Dist it  = is the absolute difference between the mean forecast and  the analysts’ forecasts 
at the time the forecasts are  issued, 
 
   ρ i t     =   the forecast specific ratio of  private information to total variability, 
 
Skill i t  = 1 if the skill level is above the mean and is  calculated based on ranks obtained 
from mean forecast errors over years by specific analysts.  
 
  
A significant coefficient in  the ratio of  common  to total information  provides 
evidence that the distance from the consensus estimate is associated with the amount of 
private information disclosed in the forecasts. To further investigate this issue, I partition 
the sample into high and low dispersion categories and estimate the equation again.14  
4.3  Market Response 
  I investigate whether the market reacts  to divergent forecasts issued by skilled 
analysts.  Numerous studies have investigated the information content of earnings by 
regressing abnormal returns, cumulated over a short window surrounding the earnings 
announcement date, on unexpected earnings. I use a similar approach and test 
 
14 In this study, I choose to classify a high dispersion firm by calculating the standard deviation for all the 
firm specific estimates in the period.  If the standard deviation is above the 75th percentile of the sample 
then the firm is classified as a high dispersion firm.  
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cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day period around the forecast release date.  The 
basic regression model takes the following form: 
CAR it = α0 + β1 Dist it  + β2 Skill k + β3 (Dist it * Skill k) + β4∑
=
16
1j
YR t  
+ β5 ∑
=
2
1j
λj X it + ε it                                        (7) 
 
where: 
CAR it = a 3-day market adjusted return for firm i over the interval extending from one 
trading day prior to the forecast announcement date through one trading day after the 
forecast announcement, 
 
Dist it = is the absolute difference between the consensus forecast and the analysts’ 
forecast at the time the forecast is issued, and 
 
Skill it  =  is 1 if the  skill level  of  the historic errors is above the mean,  which is 
calculated based on ranks obtained from mean forecast errors over the years  1983-2000 
by specific analysts, 0 otherwise. 
  
YRt     =  year specific dummy. 
 
Xit      = Log of  assets and leverage used as control variables.  
 
 
Equation seven measures  market response at the release time of the forecast. In the 
next test, I focus on abnormal returns cumulated over the estimate date and the earnings 
announcement date. I hypothesize that lack of consensus reduces the probability that a 
positive forecast error will really be positive. To test the effect of consensus at the 
earnings realization, I will estimate the regression model below. 
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CAR it = α0 + β1 Dis it   + β2 Skill k   + $3 SUEit  +$4 (  Dis it*SUEit ) 
                     +  $5 (Skill k * SUE it) +$6 (Dis it * SUE it * Skill k)    
                               +β7∑
=
16
1j
YR t + β8 ∑
=
2
1j
λj X it +, it                      (8)                                                
where: 
CAR it = Abnormal returns cumulated over the estimate date of the specific forecast  and 
earnings announcement date for the firm 
 
Dis it  =  1 if the average distance is above the mean, 0 otherwise 
 
Skill it  =  1 if the skill level is above the mean , calculated based on ranks obtained from 
mean forecast errors over years by specific analysts, and 
 
SUE itj    = analyst specific forecast errors calculated by taking the difference between the 
actual earnings and the estimate provided by the specific analyst. 
 
YRt        =  year specific dummy. 
 
Xit         = Log of  assets and leverage used as control variables.  
 
 
The coefficients tested in the regression model will provide evidence regarding 
hypothesized relations. For example, a significant and positive coefficient indicates a 
positive relation between the distance and the  cumulative abnormal returns. I expect the 
coefficient of the distance to be significant and negative, but when distance interacts 
with the skill  I expect to find a significant  positive coefficient.   To further investigate 
this issue, I will partition the sample into high and low dispersion and estimate the 
equation again.  A significant difference between coefficients will provide further 
evidence that dispersion makes a difference.  
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Next, I turn my attention to the effects of dispersion on the premium (penalty) 
associated with meeting (not meeting) expectations. In this model, I test whether 
dispersion and skill of analysts make a difference in the premium associated with 
meeting or beating expectations.  I create new consensus numbers based on the skill 
levels of the analysts, and estimate the following regression models. 
CAR it = α0 + β1Short it   + β2 Beat it  + β3 UE it  + β4 Disp it  + β5  (UE* Disp it) 
+β6(UE it * Beat it)+ β7(UE* Disp it * Beat it) + λ∑
=
5
1j
j X jit + ε it    (9) 
      
CAR it = α0 + α1 SA Short it   +  α2 SA Beat it  +  α3UE it  +α4 Disp it   
+ α5  (UE* Disp it)  +α6 (UE it *SA Beat it)+ α7(UE* Disp it * SABeat it)  
+ λ∑
=
5
1j
j X jit + ε it          (10) 
where: 
CAR it = a 3-day market adjusted return for firm i over the interval extending from one 
trading day prior to the earnings announcement date through one trading day after the 
earnings announcement.  
 
Disp it =  the standard deviation of all the forecasts for time t, 
 
UE it   = unexpected earnings for firm i, which is defined as the difference between 
actual quarterly earnings per share in quarter t and the consensus analyst forecast as 
obtained from I/B/E/S, deflated by the end-of quarter stock price, 
 
Short it = 1 when actual earnings in the quarter falls below the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast; otherwise 0, 
 
Beat it  = 1 when actual earnings in the current quarter exceeds the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast; otherwise 0, 
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SA Short it = 1 when actual earnings in the quarter falls below the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast issued by skilled analysts; otherwise 0, 
 
SA Beat it=  1 when actual earnings in the current quarter exceeds the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast issued by skilled analysts; otherwise 0, and 
 
X jt=  UE interacted with a vector of control variables identified in the prior literature as 
cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. 
 
The control variables that are contained in X j   are growth, leverage, risk and 
earnings permanence. Prior research has found these variables to be important 
determinants of the earning response coefficients (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and 
Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Growth is defined as the market-to-book 
ratio as of the end of the quarter. Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the 
sum of long-term debt, preferred stockholder equity, and common stock holders’ equity. 
A firm’s market model beta calculated using the CRSP equally weighted market 
portfolio, is used as a proxy for risk.15 Firm size is the log of total assets. I use the E it/ Pit 
ratio to control for earnings’ persistence where E it is reported earnings per share for 
quarter t and Pit is the end-of-quarter price. 
Finally, I investigate the effects of  Reg FD as an externality and test the effects 
that it might have on the ratio of public to  private information. To test my final 
hypothesis, I partition the sample based on the amount of dispersion and investigate 
whether dispersion affects the ratio of public to private information contained in the 
forecasts 
                                                 
15 The firm-specific beta was calculated using days –60 through –11 and +11 through +60 relative to the 
earnings announcement date.  
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4.4 Sample Selection Procedures 
 The initial sample consists   of 1,195,134 firm-quarter observations (12,551 
firms) from 1983 through 2001 for which analyst forecast data is available on the 2001 
version of  the   I/B/E/S database.  From this initial sample, I eliminate those firms that 
have less than two forecasts per period and missing actual earnings per share in the 
database.  My research design requires at least two forecasts in order to calculate the 
amount of private information.  Accordingly, those  firms that do  not have at least two 
forecasts for the period can not be used in the regression analyses, which further reduce  
the sample by 186,318 firm-quarter observations. 16  To increase the power of the tests, 
the sample is reduced   so that the study can capture  the effects associated with high 
dispersion and analysts’ coverage17. The sample was further reduced because of 
insufficient CRSP and Compustat data items which are necessary in calculating  the 
abnormal returns and control variables used in this  model.  Criteria to be retrained in the 
final sample are outlined in Panel A of Table 1. The data contained extreme values for 
unexpected earnings, growth and standard deviation which were eliminated if they were 
less than 1% or more than 99% of the distribution. Financial statement data and earnings 
announcement dates were obtained from Compustat Quarterly. Stock return data were 
obtained from CRSP. Analyst information and actual earnings-per-share data were 
obtained from I/B/E/S.    
                                                 
16  The 133,622 firm-quarter observations eliminated due to this requirement is less than 9 times the 
observations used in the study.   
17 To be more specific, I delete the firms are not being followed by 15 analysts for some of the tests. I also 
use the 75 percentile range to identify high dispersion firms. 
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4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in this  
study.  The market value of the firms averaged $3,085 million, and the average total 
assets were $4,880 million.  Panel B also provides descriptive statistics with regards to 
the dispersion that exists among financial analysts. The mean dispersion is 0.073.  The 
10th percentile  is 0.004  and the 90th percentile is 0.110.  Distance is calculated as the 
difference between the mean analysts’ forecast and the individual forecast at the time the 
estimate is issued. The average absolute distance is 0.037 and ranges from 0.000 to 
0.085. The private information variable has a mean of 0.122 and ranges from zero to 
0.484.  These statistics are similar to results documented in prior studies.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Rees and Adut (2002) and Rees and Lopez provide similar results in their study. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPERICAL RESULTS 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1   The Effect of Skill and Private Information on Distance. 
 
  Empirical Tests of H1 
 
 
 My initial tests investigate whether there is a correlation between the distance 
from the mean and the amount of private information possessed by a specific analyst.   I 
expect to find a significantly positive association between Dis and skill level possessed 
by analysts.  Consistent with my predictions, Panel A of Table 2 provides evidence that   
the amount of private information, skill and the interaction between the skill and the 
amount of private information are all positive and significant.19     
In October of 2000,   The Securities and Exchange Commission implemented 
Regulation Fair Disclosure. A primary objective of Reg FD is to eliminate selective 
disclosure of all material information about companies’ past and future operating 
performance. This regulation may have an affect on the amount of private information 
disseminate to market participants and the analysts. To control for this, I partition the 
sample into two periods: before and after the regulation. 
                                                 
19 To further investigate the issue I check to see whether the coefficients are significantly different from 
each other. These tests are provided in Panel B of Table 2. The findings provide evidence that the 
coefficients are significantly different from each other at the one percent level and better. 
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 Consistent with my predictions, skill, amount of private information and the 
interaction variables are still significant and the adjusted –R2 increases to 7.11%, more 
than double, as compared to pre-periods.    The results indicate that the coefficient 
associated with the private information increases after Reg FD.20  However, the 
coefficient associated with the interaction between the skill and the amount of private 
information decreases after the implementation of the new regulation.   To further 
investigate the issue, Panel B of Table 2 presents the results of the tests that compare the 
coefficients of the variables before and after the implementation.  The results indicate 
that there are significant differences between the coefficients.  All of my findings are 
consistent with the notion that there is relationship between the distance from the mean 
and the amount of private information that the analysts have. This relationship holds 
after controlling for the skill of the analysts.  
The amount of private information as identified in Barron et al (1998) depends 
on the covariance between the analysts. Covariance and dispersion become more 
meaningful when a firm is being followed by a larger number of analysts.  To increase 
the robustness of the results, I estimate the model again and only include the firms that 
are being followed by eight or more analysts.  The results presented in Panel C provide 
evidence that the amount of private information is still significant and positively 
correlated with the distance.  
                                                 
20 Mohanrem and Sunder (2002) report similar results. 
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The coefficient is even higher for firms that are being followed by eight or more 
analysts. Skill variable is also significant and the coefficient is higher for widely 
followed firms. One interesting result is that the coefficient on private information 
decreases in Post-Reg FD period for high coverage firms but increases for the full-
sample.  Another interesting point is that the coefficient on interaction between the skill 
and private information is higher for widely followed firms. These results provide 
evidence that the skill of the analyst becomes more important for widely followed firms.  
The association between the distance and the amount of private information is 
significantly positive and is consistent throughout the analysis. 
5.2 Abnormal Returns Based on Skill, Private Information at Analysts’ Estimate Date.   
 
Empirical Tests of H2 
 
 
The second hypothesis investigates whether there is a market reaction associated 
with the divergent forecasts at the time these forecasts are issued. To test this, I 
investigate the abnormal returns around three days surrounding the estimate date. The 
design involves year dummies to control for time effects. Since my data extends from 
1983 to 2001, it was necessary to control for time effects.21    
                                                 
21 Shane et al. (2002) uses a similar design to test the effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure.  
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The abnormal returns were calculated using the CRSP value- weighted market 
portfolio.22 Panel A of Table 3 provides evidence that distance is significantly and 
negatively associated with cumulative abnormal returns when there is a five day 
difference between the estimate date and the earnings announcement date. This finding 
is consistent with the notion that the markets react negatively to forecasts that are away 
from the mean estimate. One possible explanation for this finding could be that the 
markets do not believe the validity of the estimate because it is different from the mean 
of the other estimates.  Consistent with this idea, the results indicate that when the 
distance is interacted with the perceived skill (measured as the historical accuracy of the 
analysts) of the analysts, there is a significant and positive market reaction. Although the 
overall effect is still negative, the fact that the divergent forecast is issued by a skilled 
analysts lowers the negative association  
 In this test, I focus on firms that have high analyst coverage and I restrict the sample 
where there is a five day difference between the estimate date and the earnings 
announcement date. There are a couple of reasons for these restrictions. First, the 
markets will be more likely to react to divergent estimates of widely covered firms just 
due to information dissemination. If a firm is widely followed by analysts, this new 
piece of information will be readily available for investors to use.  Second, I restrict the 
sample to include only divergent forecasts that stay divergent as the time gets closer to 
earnings announcement date.  Investors will most likely over look a divergent forecast at 
                                                 
22  I also estimated the regression models using the equally- weighted market portfolio and the results were 
qualitatively similar. 
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the beginning of the period thinking that these divergent forecasts will get revised down 
or upwards depending on the consensus estimate.  
Next, I investigate the effects of dispersion on abnormal returns. Panel B of Table 3 
provides evidence about dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation of all the 
estimates by firm and period.  The results provide evidence that, consistent with the prior 
findings, distance is significant and negative.  The interaction between the distance and 
skill is still positive and significant. The coefficients provide evidence that the negative 
association implied by distance is lowered when the divergent estimates are issued by 
skilled analysts.  Although, the interaction between distance, skill and dispersion is not 
significant, the coefficient is significantly different when compared with the coefficient 
on the interaction between distance and skill.   
5.3 Abnormal Returns Based on Distance and Skill at Earnings Announcement Date. 
Empirical Tests of H3 
 
 
 The results presented in Table 3 provide evidence that distance and skill 
variables are associated with cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement date of 
the estimate. I further investigate this issue by incorporating the forecast errors and 
measure cumulative abnormal returns through the period starting from the estimate date 
and extend through the earnings announcement date. Panel A of Table 4 provides 
evidence that the distance and errors are negatively correlated with the abnormal returns 
at the earnings announcement date but it turns positive and significant when interacted 
with skill. All of these findings are consistent with my hypothesis.  These findings 
provide evidence that divergent forecasts and the errors associated with divergent 
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forecasts that were issued by skilled analysts are positively associated with cumulative 
abnormal returns.  To control for year to year cross sectional dependence, I also estimate 
the annual regressions, the findings are consistent with the pooled regression results. 
Panel B of Table 4 focuses on the coefficient differences.  The tests indicate that the 
coefficient on the interaction between distance and the errors is significantly different 
from the coefficient on the interaction between distance, errors and the skill. The tests 
also indicate that the coefficient on the interaction between skill and the errors is 
significantly different  from the interaction of distance, errors and skill. These results 
justify the inclusion of these specific variables into the models. Overall the results are 
consistent with the notion that distance and skill are important variables as they relate to 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated around the estimate date for divergent forecasts 
and earnings announcement dates. 
 Table 4 establishes a link between cumulative abnormal returns and the skill and 
distance. Table 5 differentiates between high and low dispersion firms.   If the dispersion 
level is high then the consensus variable is coded 0 and 1 otherwise. The results indicate 
that consensus and distance variables retain their significance both in the pooled 
regression and annual regressions.  The coefficient on the interaction between distance, 
skill, errors and consensus is negative and significant. The results provide evidence that 
the coefficient on the interaction between errors, skill and distance is positive but when 
consensus is introduced, the incremental contribution is negative. Additionally, the test 
of the coefficients also provides evidence that the coefficients are significantly different 
from each other.  
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5.4 The Effect of Dispersion on the Premium Associated with Meeting and Beating 
Analysts’ Estimates.  
Empirical Tests of H4 
 
  
 Lopez and Rees (2002)   provide evidence that there is a premium associated with 
meeting or beating analysts’ consensus estimates.   The authors report that the 
interaction variable between unexpected earnings and the beat variable is positive and 
significant.   Table 6 presents similar results. After establishing consistent results, I 
introduce the dispersion variable to the model. The results are still consistent, but I find 
that the interaction variable between unexpected earnings, dispersion, and beating the 
consensus estimates is negative and significant in both the pooled and annual 
regressions. Although the coefficient is negative, in absolute value it is less that the 
coefficient on the interaction variable (UE*Beat).23 These results suggest that the 
premium is lower for firms that beat with high dispersion.   To further investigate the 
issue, Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of the coefficient differences. The results 
indicate that the coefficient associated with unexpected earnings and the beat variable is 
significantly different from the interaction variable that includes unexpected earnings, 
dispersion, and beat.24   
                                                 
23 In the annual regressions, the coefficient on the interaction (UE*Beat*Disp) is slightly higher than the 
coefficient on the UE*Beat.  
24 The robustness of the results was checked by using the mean forecasts as well. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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These results provide evidence that dispersion is an important factor in determining 
the premium associated with meeting or beating analysts’ estimates.  
The second issue that I investigate is whether there is a premium associated with 
meeting or beating skilled analysts’ mean estimates. To test this hypothesis, I combine 
equation 9 and 10 and estimate the model.  The results are presented in Table 7.  The 
results are consistent with  my earlier findings in the sense that unexpected earnings and 
the beat variables are significant and positive  in both  the pooled regressions and the 
annual regressions.  The interaction variable between unexpected earnings and 
dispersion is also negative and significant.   The beat variable for the skilled analysts is 
not significant in the pooled regression but it is significant in the annual regressions.  
The short variable for the skilled analysts is not significant in both regressions.   The 
results of Panel B of Table 7 present evidence that the coefficients of beat and the 
SAbeat (the mean for skilled analysts) are significantly different.  The results also 
indicate that the coefficients of SAbeat and SAshort are significantly different. 
5.5 The Differential Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on High and Low Dispersion 
Firms. 
Empirical Tests of H5 
  
 
Research to date has not differentiated between high dispersion and low dispersion 
firms when investigating the effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure.  Table 8 presents the 
results of the empirical tests which consider this difference. The results indicate that 
there is a significant difference in  the amount of public information between low and 
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high dispersion firms. 25   The results indicate that the amount of public information is 
significantly higher for low dispersion firms as compared to high dispersion firms before 
the new regulation as well as after the implementation of Reg FD.  Significant 
differences on the amount of public information between high and low dispersion firms 
provide evidence that dispersion does make a difference on the amount of public 
information inherent in analysts’ forecasts. In this paper, I provide preliminary evidence 
and this area should be further investigated.  
 
 
 
                                                 
25  Table 8 presents the ratio of the public information as identified in Barron et al. (1998). The measure 
used in this table applies to all of the firms as opposed to specific estimates. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research to date has provided empirical evidence that analysts’ reports, including 
both earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, are widely transmitted and have a 
significant impact on stock prices (Womack 1996; Lys and Sohn 1990, among others). 
Although this area has been researched quite extensively, the majority of the papers 
focuses on or uses the mean expectations. In this paper, I take a different approach and 
investigate dispersion among analysts’ estimates as well as the divergent forecasts issued 
by analysts. 26   I posit that divergent forecasts provide additional information to  
investors and  that dispersion makes a difference in the abnormal returns surrounding 
estimate days as well as in the period between the estimate date and earnings 
announcement date. In addition, I investigate whether Regulation Fair Disclosure has 
changed the information environment with regards to dispersion.27  In this paper, I 
provide empirical evidence on five issues related to dispersion and divergent forecasts: 
1) Is the distance from the consensus estimate associated with the amount of private 
information and the skill of the analyst? ; 2) Do the markets react to divergent estimates 
issued by skilled analysts at the estimate announcement date? ;  
                                                 
26 Some other papers that deal with dispersion are Daley et al. 1988; Ziebart 1990;  Imhoff  and Lobo 
1992; Lang and Lundholm 1996;  Barron and Stuerke 1997;  Barron et al. 1998 
27  I measure the amount of private information using Barron et al. (1998) methodology, this, measure 
includes both the private communications that an analyst might have as well as the specific expertise of a 
specific analyst.  Reg FD might actually decrease the amount of private information communicated by the 
management but at the same time increase the expertise of the analyst as evidenced in Shane et al. (2002). 
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3) Does the market response associated with forecast errors at the earnings 
announcement date differ based on distance and skill? ; 4) Is the premium (penalty) 
associated with positive (negative) errors conditional upon the dispersion and the skill 
level of the analysts that issue the estimates? ; 5) Has Regulation Fair Disclosure had an 
effect on the ratio of public information to private information between high dispersion 
and low dispersion firms? 
The results indicate that the amount of private information is positively 
associated with the distance and this relation holds when private information variable is 
interacted with the skill.  These results provide evidence that when analysts issue a 
divergent forecast, this forecast is associated with private information. One interesting 
finding is that the explanatory power of the model doubled after the implementation of 
the regulation Fair Disclosure. The coefficient on the private information has increased 
as well, this finding is consistent with the notion that the association between divergent 
forecasts and the amount of private information has increased as a result of the new 
regulation.    Significant and positive differences provide evidence that there is a 
temporal difference among the variables.  
The second issue that I examine is whether the markets react to this increased 
amount of private information in a three-day window surrounding the estimate date.   
My evidence indicates that there is a negative association between distance and the 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the estimate date. These results are consistent 
with the notion that the markets will perceive the existence of a divergent forecast as a 
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bad news scenario unless the estimate is issued by a skilled analyst28.   The positive 
reaction to divergent forecasts issued by skilled analysts is smaller for high dispersion 
firms. This finding is consistent with the notion that the markets value dispersion as  
bad news and  assign a lower multiple to divergent forecasts issued by skilled analysts.  
Next, I investigate the market response to divergent forecasts around a longer 
window.  This will provide insights with regards to the valuation of the errors for 
divergent  forecasts. The abnormal returns are calculated over the period starting from 
the day the divergent forecast is issued and extends till earnings announcement date.  My 
results are consistent with  prior findings in the sense that cumulative abnormal returns 
(long window) are associated with divergent forecasts that are issued by skilled analysts.   
In a high dispersion setting, the results provide evidence that consensus decreases 
the magnitude of the market response associated with divergent forecasts issued by 
skilled analysts. Over all, the results are consistent with the notion that dispersion does 
make a difference in the market responses associated with divergent forecasts. 
Lopez and Rees (2002) provide evidence that there  is a premium associated with 
meeting and beating analysts’ expectations.  Consistent with their study, I find a positive 
reaction to unexpected earnings and to beating expectations.  In this paper, I provide 
evidence that dispersion is also associated with the premium associated with meeting 
and beating analysts’ forecasts. 
                                                 
28  This finding is consistent with prior studies in the sense that a divergent forecast will increase the 
dispersion about the future cash flows of the company and this will be perceived as bad news. However, if 
this forecast is issued by a skilled analyst then there is a positive reaction which increases the credibility of 
the forecast and investors pay more attention and this is perceived to be a positive scenario. 
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I document a smaller and a negative coefficient on the interaction variable 
(UE*Disp*Beat*). These results are consistent with the prior findings in the sense that 
dispersion is perceived as bad news and lowers the premium associated with meeting or 
beating the forecasts. 
 Prior tests provide evidence that the distance from the mean is associated with 
cumulative abnormal returns and if these divergent estimates are issued by skilled 
analysts then the markets react positively.  I take the next step and test whether mean 
expectations formed by skilled analysts would constitute a better benchmark with 
regards to market reaction surrounding the earnings announcement date. Although this 
variable is not significant in the pooled models, it is significant in the annual regressions, 
and coefficient tests indicate that it is significantly different from the beat variable. The 
results provide partial support for my hypothesis. 
Finally, I investigate whether regulation Fair Disclosure had a different effect on 
high dispersion firms. My results are consistent with the notion that low dispersion firms 
have more public information when compared to low dispersion firms. This finding is 
supported after the implementation of Reg FD as well. These findings support that there 
are significant differences between low and high dispersion firms. 
Overall, my findings provide evidence that dispersion does make a significant 
difference in the information environment of analysts. More specifically, I provide 
evidence that divergent forecasts are associated with the amount of private information 
and the markets respond to these estimates differently conditioned upon the skill level of 
the analysts.  These conclusions are also supported when I investigate the abnormal 
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returns over a long window period which starts  the day the divergent forecast is 
estimated and ends on the day the earnings are announced.  This paper extends the prior 
research by introducing dispersion when calculating the premium associated with 
meeting or beating the analysts’ estimates. My findings suggest that the premium 
associated with beating the consensus forecast is lower  when the model is estimated for 
high dispersion firm. The results indicate that there is a negative association between 
cumulative abnormal returns and the interaction variable between dispersion, unexpected 
earnings and beating the consensus estimate. 
My study has several limitations. First, I examine the information environment of 
analysts within the context of forecasts, my conclusions can not be generalized to 
analysts’ reports and other services provided by them.29  Second, as a theoretical 
construct this paper relies on a model presented in Barron et al. (1998) study, therefore 
my conclusions are constrained by the limitations of the model.  Finally, my sample 
includes firms and forecasts that are covered in I/B/E/S, the inferences about the amount 
of private information can be different if other forecasts (for example, Whisper forecasts 
can be an alternative source for private information) are considered.30 
In this paper, I provide evidence with regards to divergent forecasts and 
dispersion as it relates to private information and market response associated with these 
estimates.  
                                                 
29  For example, Dugar A. and S. Nathan   investigate analysts’ recommendations. 
30 Bagnoli et al (1999). and Rees et al. (2003)  investigate whisper forecasts as alternative sources of 
information. 
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Because of the differences between the accounting systems, it would be interesting to 
investigate the role of divergent forecasts and private information in an international 
setting. The differences between code law and common law based accounting systems 
might be a good foundation to justify the need for future studies as they relate to private 
information. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
 No. of Firms 
 
No. of Observations 
Firms found on I/B/E/S31                                        12,551                   1,195,134 
Less: Insufficient forecast data32 (3,625)  (186.318) 
          Insufficient Compustat, CRSP 
          Data33  
(1,707) (107,523) 
Final Sample 7,219 901,293 
   
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics34 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median 10th Perc. 90th Perc. 
Dis 0.037 0.104 0.010 0.000 0.085 
D 0.122 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.484 
Disp 0.073 1.415 0.02 0.004 0.110 
TA $4,880 21,910 $576 $61 $9,078 
MVE $3,085 147,39 $40 $73 $5,380 
 
 
                                                 
31 The 2001 version of the I/B/E/S database was employed to gather the initial sample. Years of coverage 
extend from 1983 to 2001. 
32 Firms that have less than 2 forecasts were deleted  since the private information proxy can not be 
calculated. Firms  that did not have their actual earnings per share in the database were also deleted. 
33 Compustat data is necessary to calculate growth, leverage, and size. CRSP data is necessary to calculate 
the abnormal returns. The outliers are also deleted in this screen. 
34 Descriptive statistics are provided for the following  variables: 
 Dis         =  absolute difference between the mean forecast and analysts’ forecast at the time the forecast is 
issued; 
D             =  forecast specific ratio of private information to total variability; 
 Disp       = standard deviation of all the forecasts for time t. 
TA          = book value of total assets (in millions); and 
MVE      = end of  quarter market value of equity (in millions). 
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Table 2 
Regression Results Based on Private Information and Skill 
Panel A:  Distance Model35  
                            Disit  =  αo  +  β1 ρit   + β2 Skill k  +  β3 (Skill * ρit )   + εit  (full sample) 
            Dis it  =  αo  + N1 ρit   +N2   Skill k  + N3  (Skill * ρit )   + εit   (pre-Reg FD) 
                            Dis it  =  αo  +  8 1ρit   +  82 Skill k  +   83 (Skill * ρit )   + εit (post-Reg FD) 
 
                                              Int.                       D                      Skill                          Skill* D                   Adj-R2 
Coef. from pooled 
regression 
(t-statistics) 
 
0.018** 
(119.40) 
 
0.023** 
(45.87) 
 
0.027** 
(125.24) 
 
0.028** 
(39.60) 
 
 
3.22 % 
Pre- Reg FD Period 
(n=942,921) 
 
0.018** 
(113.17) 
 
0.022** 
(40.97) 
 
0.026** 
(115.96) 
 
0.028** 
(37.84) 
 
 
3.17 % 
Post-Reg FD Period 
(n=65,895) 
 
0.020** 
(56.65) 
 
0.026** 
(33.03) 
 
0.020** 
(36.76) 
 
0.016** 
(11.90) 
 
7.11 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35  *, **   significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
Dis          =   is the absolute difference between the mean forecast  and specific analysts’ forecast at the 
time the forecast is issued. 
   D          =   forecast specific ratio of private information to total variability.  
Skill        =   calculated based on ranks obtained from mean forecast errors over the time period by specific 
analysts; 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Tests of Panel A Coefficient Differences  
Coefficient Difference                              F-value   
N1-81=0 91.62** 
N2-82=0 45.10** 
N3-83=0 77.97** 
 
Panel C: Regression Results Based on Private Information and Skill For  firms that are Being 
Followed by Eight or more Analysts 
 
                      Disit  =  αo  +  β1 ρit   + β2 Skill k  +  β3 (Skill * ρit )   + εit   (full Sample) 
      Dis it  =  αo  + N1 ρit   +N2   Skill k  + N3  (Skill * ρit )   + εit    (pre-Reg FD) 
                    Dis it  =  αo  +  8 1ρit   +  82 Skill k  +   83 (S kill * ρit )   + εit (post-Reg FD)            
 
                                              Int.                       D                      Skill                          Skill* D                   Adj-R2 
Coef. from pooled 
regression 
(t-statistics) 
 
0.029*** 
(169.60) 
 
0.030*** 
(63.14) 
 
0.054*** 
(120.21) 
 
0.039*** 
(29.68) 
 
4.50% 
Pre- Reg FD Period 
(n=550,093) 
 
0.029*** 
(160.18) 
 
0.030*** 
(59.62) 
 
0.051*** 
(110.68) 
 
0.037*** 
(27.20) 
 
4.31% 
Post-Reg FD Period 
(n=65,947) 
 
0.028*** 
(82.49) 
 
0.026*** 
(33.69) 
 
0.029*** 
(22.88) 
 
 
0.027*** 
(8.74) 
 
5.05% 
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Table 3 
Regression Results Based on Skill, Private Information and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns at the Estimate Announcement Date 
             
Panel A:  Abnormal returns surrounding analyst’s estimate date.36 For high following  
analysts  and  5 days difference between the estimate date and the  
earnings announcement date. 
 
CAR it =  "0 +$1  Dist it + $2 Skill k +$3 ( Dis it *Skill k )   +$4  ∑
=
16
1j
YR t   +$5∑ X
=
2
1l
γ   +, it 
 
 
                                                      
                                                         Int               Dis                  Skill                   Dis*Skill           Adj-R2 
 
Coefficients from 
Regressions 
(t-statistics) 
 
0.056*** 
(10.27) 
 
-0.187*** 
(-6.57) 
 
-0.011*** 
(-5.22) 
 
0.158*** 
(4.38) 
 
3.84% 
Annual Mean  
Coefficients 
0.045 -0.084 -0.012 0.092  
 
  
                                              
 
                                                 
36    *, **,***   significant at 0.05 , 0.01 and higher than 0.001 respectively 
CAR   = the 3-day market-adjusted abnormal return using the CRSP value-weighted  market portfolio 
return cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the estimate announcement 
date 
    Dis   =   is the absolute difference between the mean forecast and specific analysts’ forecast at the time the 
forecast is issued.  
    Disp   =  1 if he standard deviation is higher than the 75 percentile 
    Skill   =calculated based on ranks obtained from mean forecast errors over the time period by specific 
analysts. 
   La        =    log of assets included as a control for size. Used as control variables 
   Lev      =  a firms’ leverage  and is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt, 
preferred stock holders’ equity and common stock holders’ equity; used as control variables 
   YR       =   Year specific dummy. 
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Panel B: Model Including Dispersion For High Following Analysts and 5 Days Difference  
between the Estimate Date and the Earnings Announcement Date. 37 
 
CAR it =  "0 +$1  Dist it + $2 Skill k + $3 Disp it + $4 ( Dis it *Skill k )   + $5  (Dist it * Skill k * Disp it  ) 
                                 +$4  ∑
=
16
1j
YR t   +$5 X∑
=
2
1l
γ   +, it 
 
 
 Int          Dis            Skill        Disp          Dis*          Dis* 
                                                                  Skill          Skill * 
                                                                                   Disp   
Coefficients  from 
Pooled regressions
 
 
0.056*** 
 
 
-0.201*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
0.002 
 
 
0.181*** 
 
 
-0.043 
 
3.82% 
T-Statistics (10.21) (-7.01) (-5.31) (0.47) (4.28) (-0.97)  
$4 -$5 =0       8.79***  
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37  *, **,***   significant at 0.05 , 0.01 and higher than 0.001 respectively. 
The interaction variable between distance and dispersion was removed from the model because of severe 
multicollinearity issues. 
Control variables that are used in the model are log of assets and leverage. These factors have been found 
to be significant in prior studies. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results Based on Skill, Private Information and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around the Estimate Date and Earnings 
 Announcement Date. 
             
Panel A:  Abnormal returns surrounding estimate date and earnings announcement date.38 
 
CAR it = α0  + β1 Dis   + β2 Skill   +  $3 SUEit + β4 (Dis  *Skill ) +$5 (  Dis *SUEit ) 
                     +     $6 (Skill it * SUE it ) +$7 (Dis  * SUE it * Skill)   + , it                                            
                                           
 
   
                           Int.       Dis         Skill          SUE          Dis*       Skill*      Dis*             
                                                                                        SUE        SUE      SUE* 
                                                                                                                     Skill    Adj-R2 
Coef. from pooled
regression 
(t-statistics) 
 
0.005*** 
(20.20) 
 
-0.246***
(61.95) 
 
-0.002***
(-5.82) 
 
-0.068***
(-24.57) 
 
-0.090***
(-23.43) 
 
0.055*** 
(19.34) 
 
0.094*** 
(24.43) 
 
1.67% 
Mean coef. from  
annual regressions
(t-statistic) 
 
0.007*** 
(3.24) 
 
-0.020***
(5.45) 
 
-0.004***
(-2.73) 
 
-0.069***
(-3.53) 
 
-0.07*** 
(-3.22) 
 
0.047* 
(2.55) 
 
0.070 
(3.29)*** 
 
[ No of Coef.>0] [17/19] [1/19] [4/19] [1/19] [7/19] [18/19] [14/19]  
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 *, **,***   significant at 0.05 , 0.01 and higher than 0.001 respectively. 
CAR it  = abnormal returns cumulated over the estimate date for a specific forecast and the earnings       
announcement date for the firm. 
    Dis       =    1 if the distance is above the mean 0 otherwise 
   Skill      =   1 if  an analyst is considered skilled (past mean forecast errors) 0 otherwise. 
   Sue            =  Analyst specific forecast errors calculated by taking the difference between the actual earnings 
and the estimate provided by the specific analyst. 
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Table  4 (continued) 
Panel B :Test of Panel A Coefficient differences 
          Coefficient Difference                              F-value  
$5 -$7 =0 582.14*** 
$6 -$7 =0 40.55*** 
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Table 5 
 Regression Results Based on Skill, Private Information, 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Consensus  
             
Panel A:  For firms that are being followed by 16 or more analysts.39 
CAR it =  α0 + β1 Dis it  + β2 Skill  +  $3 Sueit +   $4 Conit  
                     +β5 (Sue it * Skill) +$6( Disit* Sueit) +$7 (Sueit *Conit)   
                     +β8(Sue it * Dis it * Skill) + $9 (Skill *Sueit *Conit)  
                     +$10 (Dis it *Sue it*Con it) +$11 (Dis it *Skill*Con it)     
                      +$12 (Dis it*Skill*Sue it *Con it)   +,it                                        
Variable Name  Coef, from pooled  
regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Mean coef. from 
annual regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Number of  positive 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
Adj-R2 
Intercept 0.010**** 
(6.42) 
0.012**** 
(4.10) 
 
[16/17] 
2.70 % 
Dis -0.631**** 
(-26.46) 
-0.019**** 
(-4.33) 
 
[2/17] 
 
Skill -0.00 
(-0.11) 
-0.002 
(-1.07) 
 
[5/17] 
 
Sue 0.015 
(0.96) 
0.006 
(0.14) 
 
[7/17] 
 
Con -0.014**** 
(-14.21) 
-0.014**** 
(-2.89) 
 
[3/17] 
 
Sue*Skill -0.02 
(-1.24) 
-0.041 
(-0.81) 
 
[10/17] 
 
Dis*Sue -0.06**** 
(-2.71) 
-0.058 
(-1.18) 
 
[5/17] 
 
Sue*Con -0.079**** 
(-4.23) 
-0.050 
(-1.34) 
 
[6/17] 
 
Sue*Dis*Skill 0.143**** 
(5.62) 
0.108 
(1.48) 
 
[14/17] 
 
Skill*Sue*Con 0.076**** 
(3.68) 
0.090* 
(1.85) 
 
[11/17] 
 
Dis*Sue *Con -0.031 
(-1.23) 
-0.056 
(-1.24) 
 
[8/17] 
 
Dis*Skill*Con 0.015**** 
(9.35) 
0.007* 
(1.77) 
 
[12/17] 
 
Dis*Skill*Sue*Con -0.058* 
(-2.05) 
-0.032 
(-0.43) 
 
[6/17] 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 *,**, ***,****   significant at 0.05 , 0.01 and higher than 0.001 respectively. 
CAR   = Cumulative abnormal returns calculated around the estimate date and earnings announcement 
date for each specific estimate. 
   Dis      =   1 if the distance is above the mean; 
   Skill    = calculated based on ranks obtained from mean forecast errors over the time period by specific 
analysts. 
    Sue    = Analyst specific forecast errors calculated by taking the difference between the actual earnings and 
the estimate provided by the specific analyst. 
    Con  = 1 if the standard deviation is above the mean, 0 otherwise 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B:  Test of Panel A Coefficient differences 
 
Coefficient Difference                              F-value  
$8 -$12 =0 14.85*** 
$11 -$12 =0 6.54*** 
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Table 6   
 Regression Results Based on Unexpected Earnings, Meeting and Dispersion 
 
   
Panel A: Abnormal returns surrounding earnings’ announcement date.40 
CAR it = α0 + β1Short it   + β2 Beat it  + β3 UE it  + β4 Disp it  + β5  (UE* Disp it) 
                     +β6(UE it * Beat it)+ β7(UE* Disp it * Beat it) + λ∑
=
5
1j
j X jit + ε it   
 
Variable Name  Coef, from pooled  
regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Mean coef. from 
annual regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Adj-R2 
Intercept -0.002 
(-1.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
4.04% 
Short -0.003 
(-1.68) 
-0.004 
(-2.58) 
 
Beat 0.012*** 
(6.39) 
0.010*** 
(6.30) 
 
UE 1.099*** 
(14.16) 
1.132*** 
(5.53) 
 
Disp -0.001 
(-1.00) 
-0.000 
(-0.40) 
 
UE**Beat 2.00*** 
(12.39) 
1.121*** 
(3.97) 
 
UE*Disp -0.400*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.446*** 
(-4.07) 
 
UE*Disp*Beat -1.890*** 
(-9.36) 
  
                                                 
40 *, **, ***   significant at 0.05, 0.01 and higher than 0.001 respectively. 
 
 
CAR   = the 3-day market adjusted abnormal return using the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio 
return cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings announcement 
date. 
UE      = unexpected earnings:  defined as the difference between the reported earnings and the consensus 
analyst forecast. 
Short   = 1 when actual earnings fall below analysts’ forecasts 0 otherwise. 
Beat    = 1 when actual earnings exceed analysts’ forecasts 0 otherwise. 
Disp   = 1 when the  standard deviation is above the  mean 
Xj        = UE interacted with the cross-sectional earnings response coefficient determinant.  Following 
determinants are 
               Growth = market to book ratio; 
               Lev=  a firms’ leverage  and is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term 
debt, preferred stock holders’ equity and common stock holders’ equity; 
               Risk= Beta; 
               Size= the natural log of total assets; 
               Persist = a measure of persistence, defined as the earnings/price ratio for every quarter. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B :Test of Panel A Coefficient differences 
         Coefficient Difference                              F-value  
$6 -$7 =0 130.56*** 
$5 -$7 =0 37.88*** 
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    Table 7 
                  Regression Results Based on Skilled Analysts’ Mean, Dispersion and  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
       
Panel A:  Abnormal returns surrounding earnings’ announcement date.41  
         CAR it = α0 + β1 UE it +   $2 Beatit + $3 Shortit + β4 Disp it + β5  (UE* Disp it)  
 
                 +β6(UE it * Beat it) + β7(UE* Disp it * Beat it) + $8 SAbeat it +$9 SAshortit                                  
+$10 (UEit  *Dispit *SAbeatit) +  ∑ λ
=
5
1j
j X jit + ε it   
Variable Name  Coef, from pooled  
regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Mean coef. from 
annual regressions 
(t-statistic) 
Adj-R2 
Intercept -0.002 
(-1.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.92) 
3.93% 
UE 0.440** 
(12.64) 
0.585** 
(6.10) 
 
Beat 0.012** 
(7.15) 
0.010** 
(7.01) 
 
Short -0.006** 
(-3.48) 
-0.005** 
(-3.42) 
 
Disp -0.007 
(-1.63) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
 
UE*Disp -0.886** 
(-5.28) 
-0.866** 
(-2.19) 
 
UE**Beat 1.123** 
(12.23) 
0.770** 
(4.48) 
 
UE*Disp*Beat -5.39** 
(-4.10) 
-4.966** 
(-1.90) 
 
SAbeat 0.002 
(1.86) 
0.003** 
(2.49) 
 
SAshort 0.001 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
 
UE*Disp* SAbeat -0.816 
(-0.72) 
-0.639 
(-0.26) 
 
                                                 
41 *, **   significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively 
 
CAR   = the 3-day market adjusted abnormal return using the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio 
return cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings announcement 
date. 
UE      = unexpected earnings:  defined as the difference between the reported earnings and the consensus 
analyst forecast deflated by the stock price at the end of the quarter. 
Short   = 1 when actual earnings fall below analysts’ forecasts 0 otherwise. 
Beat    = 1 when actual earnings exceed analysts’ forecasts 0 otherwise. 
Disp    = 1 when the standard deviation is above the 75th percentile. 
SAbeat= 1 when actual earnings exceed skilled analysts’ mean estimates, 0 otherwise 
SAshort.=1 when actual earnings fall below skilled analysts’ forecasts ,0 otherwise 
Xj        =  UE interacted with the cross-sectional earnings response coefficient determinants. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Test of Panel A Coefficient differences 
Coefficient Difference                              F-value  
$2 - $3=0 110.49** 
$2 -$8=0 19.83** 
$8 - $9 =0 3.32 
$10-$6=0 2.95 
$7-$10=0 3.88* 
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Table 8 
Tests of the Means Based on Dispersion and Regulation Fair Disclosure 
                                     
Panel A:  Before the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure42 
 
 High Dispersion 
 Firms 
Low Dispersion  
Firms 
Test of the mean 
 difference 
The ratio of  public 
information 
0.5854 0.6507 64.86** 
N 202,000 872,000  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: After the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
 
 
 High Dispersion  
Firms 
Low Dispersion 
 Firms 
Test of the mean 
 difference 
The ratio of public 
information 
0.5583 0.6018 14.07** 
N 18,044 56,691  
                                                 
42 *, **   significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively 
 The implementation date of the regulation Fair disclosure is October 2000. 
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